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ABSTRACT 
In the 1970s motion picture studios used blind bidding and non-refundable 
guarantees to reduce the risks of producing large budget films.  However, theater owners 
claimed that blind bidding and guarantees shifted the risk to them and increased the 
likelihood of bankruptcy.  In response to lobbying by theater owners, twenty-four states 
passed laws banning blind bidding between 1978 and 1984, while seven states also banned 
non-refundable guarantees.  We find that the laws were not only ineffective in keeping 
theater owners from exiting the market; they may have been detrimental to theater owners 
converting to multiplexes at that time. 
   3 
1. Introduction 
  As a result of the Supreme Court’s 1948 landmark decision, United States vs. 
Paramount et al., the five major, vertically integrated studios were no longer allowed to 
own the theaters that showed their movies. The major studios eventually adjusted to this 
decision and to changes in post-war demographics by producing a smaller number of large 
budget films and changing their distribution strategies. The most important change in their 
relationship with theater owners was an increased use of non-refundable guarantees and 
blind bidding, which required theater owners to bid six months to one year in advance of a 
film’s release.  Since bids were submitted prior to the completion of the movie, theater 
owners bid without seeing a finished copy.  They received only a bid letter summarizing the 
plot and listing the names of the actors.   
Studios preferred blind bidding given the timely return on investment and the 
advanced coordination of the film’s release date with promotional efforts and booking of 
television advertisements, which were secured six months to one year in advance.  Studios 
claimed that there would be lengthy delays in release dates without blind bidding.  Since films 
were completed close to their release date, a requirement to show the movies in advance of 
the bidding process (that is, trade screening) may not have allowed enough time for films to 
arrive by the anticipated release date.  In addition, they contended that prices would be   4 
higher without blind bidding, because a bidding war would ensue for blockbuster films.1  
Guarantees allowed the studios a minimum expected return on their investments and offset 
the allegedly common practice of slow payment of film rentals by theater owners.2 
  On the other hand, theater owners alleged that overbidding due to blind bidding and 
guarantees resulted in many of them going out of business and raised admission prices due to 
the theater owners’ need to cover extensive losses from overbid films.3 They also claimed 
that higher rental terms would make it more difficult for some theater owners to obtain 
blockbuster films, since they would not be able to outbid the larger theater chains.   
  The Department of Justice was initially sympathetic to the theater owners’ argument. 
In response to the increased use of blind bidding, the Department of Justice concluded an 
agreement with the movie studios limiting the number of films which could be blind bid from 
January 1, 1969 to January 1, 1971 to three per studio per year.  The two-year agreement 
                                                 
1 According to Jack Valenti, the Motion Picture Association of America president during this 
time period, “With the intense competition between big theater chains, when a movie is 
shown at a screening and it’s an obvious smash, the bidding will go right through the ceiling.  
Exhibitors will bid more and will charge more at the box office” (Gottschalk, Jr., 1979, p. 1). 
2 For example, Mr. Valenti argued that “the end of blind bidding would mean fewer big 
budget, blockbuster movies …. movie companies just won’t be able to put so much money 
into a film if they don’t know for sure they have play-dates in theaters at one of the prime 
times” (Gottschalk, Jr., 1979). According to Valenti, “a substantial slowdown –let alone 
outright cutoff – of such revenue [from guarantees] would have a serious impact on 
production” (Variety, 1977, p. 7). 
3 For example, according to A. Alan Friedberg, National Association of Theater Owners 
(NATO) president, blind bidding added about 10 percent to film rentals each year, and 
without it, that savings could be passed along to the general public (Jacobson, 1979).   5 
was renewed twice.  However, the Department of Justice revoked all restrictions limiting 
blind bidding in 1975 and the practice accelerated rapidly. Once the Department of Justice 
removed the restrictions on blind bidding, theater owners actively lobbied state governments 
to ban this practice.  In response to the National Alliance of Theater Owner’s (NATO) 
efforts, twenty-four states banned blind bidding between 1978 and 1984. 
  In this paper, we report the results of natural experiments that for the first time 
evaluate systematically the conflicting claims of the theater owners and studios concerning the 
effect of laws banning blind-bidding and guarantees on the survival of theaters, ticket prices, 
and release dates of new movies.4 While we find that the strictest of the state laws helped 
some theater owners remain in business longer, this effect was short-lived.  The laws could 
not offset the impact of significant structural changes in the market. Prior to the passage of 
the first anti-blind-bidding law, theater owners had started increasing the number of screens 
per theater in order to diversify risk and exploit economies of scale.  We find that the number 
of screens per theater was the main factor influencing the survival of theater chains during this 
time period. In addition, we find evidence suggesting that the laws resulted in higher ticket 
prices. We argue that the higher prices are evidence that the laws mitigated some of the 
advantages to those theater owners who had modernized by increasing the number of 
screens per theater. 
                                                 
4 For example, Orbach and Einav (2007) note that the practice of blind bidding is as 
controversial as block booking, but less studied.   6 
  We analyze the impact of the laws on the survival of theaters in two ways. Initially, 
we use a natural experiment to compare a sample of theaters in three states that passed 
similar laws banning blind bidding in 1979 (Georgia, Tennessee, and North Carolina) with a 
sample of theaters in Florida that never had such a law.  We use a probit analysis to model 
the probability of survival controlling for theater-specific, market-specific, and theater-chain-
specific factors. We find that the laws of Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee did not 
have a statistically significant impact on the survival of theaters.   
  Given the lack of an impact of the law in these states, we use a second natural 
experiment with more detailed panel data for a sample of theaters in the two largest states 
with the strictest laws: Ohio and Pennsylvania.  The Ohio and Pennsylvania laws were 
considered the most restrictive, because they also banned guarantees.  We compare the 
survival rates of theaters in Ohio and Pennsylvania with those in Michigan and New York. 
Neither Michigan nor New York had laws against blind bidding or guarantees. We find that 
the laws of Ohio and Pennsylvania had an initial impact on survival times. However, the laws’ 
effect diminished rapidly over time and was completely reversed within a few years.    
  We also use natural experiments to investigate the conflicting claims about admission 
prices by comparing admission prices for the same movies in Cleveland, Philadelphia, 
Pittsburg, and Detroit.  We find that ticket prices were relatively higher in Ohio and 
Pennsylvania after passage of the laws. Lastly, we measure the impact of the laws on release 
dates. We pair Cleveland with Detroit, and Philadelphia with New York City.  We find that   7 
Cleveland exhibited films actually sooner after the law was enacted.  Philadelphia did not 
exhibit films any later after the passage of the law, and in most cases it received films at the 
same time as New York City.  Therefore, the data does not support the claim that the laws 
produced widespread delays. 
  In the next section we provide an historical background of contractual relations 
between the studios and theater owners. In Section 3 we present the empirical models and 
results concerning theater survival. Sections 4 and 5 present the evidence of the laws’ impact 
on prices and delays in release dates.  Section 6 provides a conclusion. 
2. Historical Background  
  Tension between the studios and independent theater owners dates to the 1930’s 
and 1940’s when the five largest studios (Paramount, Loew’s/MGM, Warner Brothers, 
Twentieth Century Fox and RKO) were vertically integrated companies.  The studios 
controlled a majority of the first and second-run outlets in major cities. Vertical integration 
allegedly minimized competition from independent producers, movie companies, and theater 
owners.  
  The Paramount decision marked the beginning of a downward industry trend that 
persisted into the early 1970’s.  As argued by Sedgwick (2002), the timing of the theater 
divestiture did not benefit the studios, as the selling coincided with the baby boom 
phenomenon after the end of World War II.  When the war ended, consumers bought 
homes and durable goods for their newly formed families.  While better educated, higher   8 
income persons generally frequented movie theaters more often, this segment of the 
population was having children at an historic pace and moving farther away from the centrally 
located theaters which the studios owned.  The studios had to divest their theaters at a time 
when the value of their holdings was declining due to lower box office revenues.   
  Television accelerated the decline in theater attendance.  By 1954 half of U.S. 
households had a television set.  By 1959, eighty-five percent of households had one 
(Waterman, 2005, p. 34).  Television quickly became the substitute for going to theaters. As 
a result, film output dropped, as the studios concentrated on producing a smaller number of 
large budget films. Figure 1 shows the total number of tickets sold between 1970 and 1985, 
while Figure 2 shows new releases for this time period. By 1970 the number of new films 
had reached a low point.  Box office returns also became more volatile than in the pre-
television years.  At the time Variety defined a successful film as one where the domestic 
rentals covered most of the cost of producing the film.  By this definition of success, about 
33 percent of big budget films were successful between 1976 through 1981 (Variety, 1986, 
p. 9).  In addition, the most important new releases were concentrated in three predictable 
periods: Christmas, pre-July 4th, and Easter. As a result, some theater owners even resorted 
to closing their doors temporarily for a few weeks or months until a peak season would   9 
arrive.5  The short supply of films escalated rental terms to a point where even larger theater 
chains claimed it was difficult to pay for them.6  
  In response to theater owners’ concern about the increased use of blind bidding, the 
Department of Justice limited the practice between January 1969 and January 1975.7  Each 
of the eight major studios at that time could blind bid up to three films per year.8 Theater 
owners had the opportunity to cancel the bidding arrangement up to forty-eight hours before 
the play-date, but it was difficult to replace the scheduled film with anything comparable.  
After January 1975, all restrictions on blind bidding were removed and the practice became 
                                                 
5 Joseph Alterman, executive director of NATO, stated in 1977, “This is the first time in 
history that so many large, economically successful theaters closed because there were no 
movies” (Gottschalk, p. 29). 
6 The rental terms are the cost paid by theater owners to distributors for the right to exhibit a 
film for a specified period of time.  Rental terms were on a sliding scale basis with a higher 
percentage allocated for the movie studios, and theater owners able to clear their house 
expenses plus receive a lower percentage of the film rental.  In the first few weeks of a new 
release the studios often received the highest of 90 percent of the box office in excess of a 
minimum negotiated house expense (which was called 90/10 percentage terms) or 70 
percent of the total box office.  The percentage the studios received dropped as the film 
progressed into later runs. 
7 Blind bidding was made illegal by a 1940 Consent Degree, however, a 1944 District Court 
opinion permitted it as long as exhibitors could reject films which were not trade screened.   
8John Shenefield, an assistant U.S. attorney, stated that “[Blind Bidding] denies exhibs the 
right to make an informed judgment as to artistic or box-office merit, tying up playing time, 
forcing huge guarantees, and resulting in ‘examples that can be cited of exhibitors having 
been driven into bankruptcy by inferior films which were blind bid….It is not surprising that 
…only the large chains are still operating profitably.  Blind bidding appears to contribute to 
this trend toward concentration of the exhibition market” (Jacobson, 1978).   10 
commonplace. The elimination of the restrictions on blind bidding in 1975 built momentum 
for the passage of the state laws.  Table 1 lists the 24 states that passed a law.   
  During the same time period the industry was undergoing important structural 
change. The box office success of Jaws in 1975 marked a change in film release strategy at 
the same time as theater owners were lobbying for legal intervention.  Universal released the 
film simultaneously in 500 theaters (Paul, 1994).  This strategy was intended to take 
advantage of the mass advertising campaign which touted the film.  Previously, movie 
companies commonly kept the number of prints below 400 in order to keep down costs 
(Gottschalk, Jr., p. 46).  This number increased to between 1,000 and 1,500 by the early 
1980’s (Myers, 1983, p. 278). At the same time theater owners started building multiplex 
theaters in shopping centers and malls.  In addition, it was common for exhibitors to convert 
existing single screen theaters into twin or multiple screen houses.  From 1975 to 1985, the 
number of screens increased by 51 percent, from 12,168 to 18,372.  In 1978, 10 percent of 
indoor theaters were multiplexes; 80 percent of which were twin theaters (International 
Motion Picture Almanac, 1978, p. 31A.).  Figure 3 displays the growth in the number of 
screens from 1970 to 1985. 
  Theater owners had several reasons to switch to multiple screens.  First, theater 
owners were adding screens to reduce risk.9  Second, multiplex theaters, especially new 
                                                 
9 Marvin Goldman, president of National Association of Theater Owners (NATO) explained 
that “if you have one theater with one thousand seats and you have a film not doing well,   11 
ones, were designed to best exploit concession sales, because the design of the buildings 
focused on a centrally located concession stand. Third, theater owners were expanding to 
shopping centers.  Since shopping center developers constructed the theaters, theater 
owners limited their investment to the furniture, fixtures, and equipment.10 In the next section 
we provide empirical evidence that the number of screens, not laws banning blind bidding 
and guarantees, was the most important factor in predicting a theater’s survival.  
3. BLIND BIDDING, GUARANTEES AND SURVIVAL  
  In this section we report the results of natural experiments measuring the impact of 
banning blind bidding and non-refundable guarantees on the probability of a theater owner 
exiting the market. First, we use a probit model to estimate the impact of the laws of 
Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee that each banned blind bidding in 1979. Second, 
for comparative purposes we also use a probit model to estimate the impact of the stricter 
laws of Ohio and Pennsylvania that banned both blind bidding and guarantees. While the 
number of screens per theater had essentially identical effects on survival in all five states 
compared to the control groups, only the laws banning both blind bidding and guarantees 
had a statistically significant impact on survival.  
                                                                                                                                             
you’re in trouble”, but “if you have a six one hundred sixty seat theaters, you might have 
three or four winners and two or three losers.  You’re better off,” (Gottschalk, p. 29). 
10 “The exhibition company that leases property may spend only $100,000 to $150,000 to 
equip and modestly furnish each auditorium, and it does not need to tie up capital in cinder 
and cement” (Guback, 2001, p. 129).   12 
  Third, we use a duration model and a more detailed data set to determine the effect 
of Ohio’s and Pennsylvania’s stricter laws over a longer period of time.  We find that 
although the laws in Ohio and Pennsylvania initially increased the probability of survival, this 
effect was short-lived and soon reversed.  The laws only delayed for a short time the 
inevitable as market and industry forces offset the effect of the laws. 
3.1  Probit Analysis of Banning Blind Bidding 
  Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee all passed similar legislation in 1979 
banning blind bidding but permitting guarantees.  We treat the passage of the anti-blind 
bidding laws as a natural experiment and use theaters in Florida, which did not pass a law, as 
a control group.  Probit models have been used often to examine firm survival.11 The probit 
model assumes that the probability that an event occurs follows the standard normal 
cumulative density function.   






) ( 1) Prob(Y f       (4.1) 
The probit model assumes that the likelihood that an event occurs depends on an 
unobservable index function.  In this case, each theater has a critical value of the index 
function above which the theater exits the market.  The critical values are assumed to follow 
a normal distribution. 
                                                 
11For example, Dunne, Klimek, and Roberts (2005) recently examine the survival rates of 
seven regional manufacturing industries in the U.S. using plant level data.     13 
3.1.1 Data 
  To estimate the immediate impact of the laws we use data for the two years before 
and after the passage of the laws (that is, 1977 and 1981).  The data consist of 228 theaters 
from thirteen cities in the four states: Florida (19), Georgia (46), North Carolina (27), and 
Tennessee (37).12  We compiled the data set in the following manner.  For the first week of 
June 1977 and June 1981, we recorded the name of all first-run theaters, the number of 
screens at each theater, and the name of the parent theater chain if relevant.  Since we could 
not always identify the theater chain which operated a theater, we used the International 
Motion Picture Almanac (IMPA) to obtain additional information.  The newspapers listed 
theaters in the city and in the nearby suburbs as well, therefore the data include the entire 
metropolitan area.     
3.1.2 Empirical Model and Results 
  We include controls for theater-specific, market-specific, and theater-chain-specific 
factors. The number of screens per theater is a control for economies of scale, quality, and 
the potential for risk reduction through diversification.  Theaters with more screens can 
diversify the risk of committing to any one film, are more cost efficient, and offer more 
                                                 
12 Data come local newspapers in the following cities Fort Lauderdale, Jacksonville, Miami, 
Orlando, and Tampa, Florida; Atlanta, Columbus, and Savannah, Georgia; Charlotte and 
Raleigh, North Carolina; and Knoxville, Memphis, and Nashville, Tennessee.   
   14 
choices to consumers (a measure of quality). We include the number of screens per theater 
in 1977 and expect this variable to be inversely related to probability of exiting the market.13   
  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) controls for the degree of market 
concentration in the local market. In industry-specific studies, high concentration ratios and 
HHIs are associated with lower entry rates.  For this reason, we expect this variable to be 
negatively related to exit.  We include the total number of screens a theater chain operated in 
the U.S. as a control for firm size.  We are unable to measure consistently the initial size of 
theater chains, so we include the total number of screens in the U.S. as of 1975.  A priori, 
we anticipate that larger theater chains are less likely to exit.  We include a dichotomous 
variable with a value of one if the theater was in Georgia, Tennessee, or North Carolina and 
zero otherwise.  
  Table 2 provides the results along with summary statistics for each variable. The HHI 
and the total number of screens a theater operates in the U.S. do not have a statistically 
significant effect.  The number of screens at the theater is the only variable with a statistically 
significant coefficient at the 5 percent level. An increase in the number of screens at a theater 
decreases the probability of the theater exiting during this time period by approximately 
fifteen percent. Most importantly, controlling for the number of screens at the theater and 
                                                 
13 We assume that a theater exits the market if any one of the following occurs: (1) there is a 
change in ownership, (2) a theater is no longer listed in the newspaper, or (3) a theater no 
longer exhibits first-run films.     15 
other industry characteristics, we find that theaters in Georgia, North Carolina, and 
Tennessee did not have statistically different exit rates than those in Florida.  
3.2 The Impact of Banning Both Blind Bidding and Guarantees  
  It is possible that the laws in Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee did not have 
an impact, because the laws did not also ban guarantees.  As a result, we next considered 
the effects of the more restrictive laws of Ohio, passed in October 1978, and Pennsylvania, 
passed in May 1980. Both laws banned blind bidding and guarantees. We again use a 
natural experiment this time using theaters in Michigan and New York as the control group. 
We present results using both a probit analysis and a duration model.  
3.2.1. Data 
  While we collected data comparable to the first sample in order to conduct a probit 
analysis, we also expanded the data set for a more detailed survival analysis. Our data for 
the survival analysis include annual data starting with the year 1977 and extending to the year 
1985 for 724 movie theaters from twenty-two cities in Ohio (204), Michigan (135), 
Pennsylvania (178), and New York (207). We recorded all theaters listed in the local 
newspaper for each city every year from 1977 to 1985.  Each year was a snapshot of the 
market on the final Friday before the 4
th of July, one of the peak periods in the year.14   
                                                 
14 We used several other references to fill gaps in the data.  The IMPA is an annual 
publication that listed large, medium, and small exhibition chains.  However, it did not 
provide a complete listing of all theater chains.  In 1975, the almanac accounted for about 53 
percent of total screens.  The remaining information came from Variety, two internet sources   16 
3.2.2. Probit Results 
  While the laws for the three states in our first sample did not have a statistically 
significant effect on the exit rate, the laws banning both blind bidding and guarantees do.  
Table 3 shows that, ceteris paribus, theater owners in Ohio and Pennsylvania were more 
likely to stay in business longer than those in the other states. Interestingly, the coefficient for 
the number of screens per theater is essentially identical to that for the first sample, while as 
before none of the other control variables had a statistically significant effect on the exit rate.  
3.3 Survival Analysis  
  While a probit analysis provides an approximation of the effect of the laws over an 
extended period of time, a theater’s propensity to survive may change as time passes. 
Survival analysis permits the use of time-varying covariates, while the probit analysis does 
not. The hazard function, ) (t h , is defined as 
   
t
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      (1) 
The numerator represents the probability a theater survives between t and t D , given that it 
has survived up to that point in time.  The inclusion of the conditional statement is necessary, 
                                                                                                                                             
(cinematreasures.org and cinematour.com), and Motor City Marquees, a thorough 
reference about theaters in the Detroit Area from 1906-1992.  We also contacted several 
theater owners from the blind bidding years for additional clarifications: Joel Resnick, former 
President of NATO; Bruce Olson, Senior Vice President of Marcus Theaters; Dick Fox, 
former President of Fox Theaters of Reading, Pennsylvania; and Jerome Gordon, President 
of Mid-Atlantic NATO.   17 
because some theaters may have already exited the market by period t.  Since the numerator 
alone is a non-decreasing function of t, it is divided by t D .  In addition, the hazard includes 
the limit of t representing increasingly smaller intervals of t and t D  until a limiting value is 
reached. 
  In this model  i T  is a random variable representing time for the ith individual so that   
      i ik k i i x x T se b b b + + + + = ... log 1 1 0 ,    (3) 
where ik x  are predictor variables, i e  is a random error term, and  k b b ,..., 0  and s  are 
parameters to be estimated.  We assume that i e  follows a Weibull distribution.  McCloughan 
and Stone (1998) used this model to investigate the shape of the hazard function for foreign 
manufacturing plants and to determine whether greenfield investments survive longer than 
acquisition plants.15  In addition, Chen (2002) utilized a Weibull model to examine the 
lifetimes of petroleum refining plants after the deregulation of crude oil markets.  The Weibull 
model assumes i e  follows the extreme value distribution with the probability density 
function, )} exp( exp{ ) ( i i i f e e e - = .  For s  equal to 1, the Weibull model simplifies to the 
exponential function which has a constant hazard function.  For s  greater than 1, the hazard 
decreases over time.  When 0.5 < s  < 1, the hazard increases at a decreasing rate.  When 
                                                 
15 Greenfield investments are a form of foreign direct investment where a company opens 
new facilities in a country creating new employment opportunities in response to government 
incentives such as tax benefits or some other kind of subsidies.    18 
0 < s  < 0.5, the hazard increases at an increasing rate.  When s  equals 0.5, the hazard 
function is an increasing straight line from the origin. 
3.3.1 Explanatory Variables 
  In addition to controlling for the number of screens per theater, we also include 
controls for firm size (total number of screens in the U.S.), prior entry and exit of 
competitors, and industry level measures of the number of new releases and total tickets 
sold. Numerous empirical studies find that entry and exit rates are positively correlated 
phenomena: higher (lower) entry rate industries are also higher (lower) exit rate industries.  
As a result, we use the gross entry rate in the local market as a control variable.  We define 
the gross entry rate as the number of new theaters divided by the total number of theaters in 
the current year.  Since the dependent variable is time, higher entry rates imply shorter 
survival times for exiting theaters, ceteris paribus. 
  Through the early 1980’s theater owners frequently complained about the shortage 
of films.  We expect more releases in a given year to extend how long a theater owner will 
survive. However, the movie studios’ focus on large-budget films in the early 1970’s also 
affected theater attendance.  We include the aggregate number of tickets sold per year as a 
covariate and expect that stronger demand correlates with theater owners remaining in 
operation longer. 
  As before, we include a dichotomous variable to capture the effect of the laws.  
However, a dichotomous variable is only one way for capturing the effect of the law in a   19 
duration model.  It is possible that the relationship between a theater owners’ survival and 
the laws may be more complex.  For this reason, we also test for the length of the impact of 
the law by interacting this variable with a dichotomous variable for the years 1982 to 1985.  
  We measure the number of tickets sold and the entry rate as a one-period lag and 
the number of new releases as a one-period lead.  We assume theater owners used the 
previous year’s box office success as an indication of how successful the present year would 
be.  However, theater owners are generally aware in time t of the number of new releases 
planned for time t + 1. 
3.3.2. Results 
  Our estimates of the parameters of the duration model for Ohio, Michigan, 
Pennsylvania and New York are shown in Table 4.  Since the laws in Ohio and Pennsylvania 
were passed a year and a half apart, we also present results separately for these two states 
in comparison to both New York and Michigan both with and without the interaction term 
controlling for the longer term effect of the laws. 
  The results are similar in all cases. The coefficient for the number of screens per 
theater is positive and statistically significant, indicating that a theater with more screens 
stayed in business longer.  The coefficients for the number of new releases and number of 
tickets sold are positive and statistically significant. We find that the coefficient for local rate 
of entry is not statistically different from zero.   20 
  As was the case in the probit analysis, the laws result in longer survival times when 
measured only by the dichotomous variable.  Controlling for the possibility that the impact 
varied over time, we find that the impact of the laws was significantly and positively 
correlated with survival times from 1978 to 1981. However, theaters left the market at a 
faster rate in these states starting in 1982. As a result, while the laws initially encouraged 
some theater owners to stay in business longer, theater owners eventually realized that the 
law was not going to sustain them. As in the case of the probit results, theater owners that 
survived had adjusted by increasing the number of screens per theater.   
  The estimated Weibull parameter,s , ranges between 0.25 and 0.33 and is 
significantly greater than zero but less than one.  Since the null hypothesis that s  equals 1 is 
rejected, the theater data are not consistent with an exponential model. More specifically, the 
function follows the pattern of positive duration dependence: the hazard rate of exit remains 
lower for earlier years but it increases at an increasing rate in later years.  
3.4 Summary of Results  
  Overall, we find that the laws banning only blind bidding had no effect on the 
likelihood of a theater owner staying in business, while the stricter laws that banned both 
blind bidding and guarantees had a limited and short-lived effect that was soon reversed. In 
our samples we found that the one consistent factor in theater survival was the number of 
screens at the theater. We also found that there were forces that resulted in a rising 
probability that traditional theaters would exit the market. As a result, even though the   21 
strictest laws delayed the switchover to multiplexes for a short time, the inevitable structural 
change in the exhibition market soon offset the impact of these laws.  
4. Admission Prices  
  We now investigate the opposing claims made by theater owners and studios 
concerning the impact of the anti-blind bidding laws on admission prices.  As noted earlier, 
the studios and distributors argued that the laws would increase the prices of those films that 
would have been blind bid otherwise.  Theater owners argued that prices would be lower.  
To test these claims we used a natural experiment of average admission prices in Detroit with 
those in Cleveland, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh before and after the passage of the laws and 
find evidence that the laws raised admission prices. We provide an explanation for why one 
should expect this result and why one could argue that the laws may have been even 
detrimental to most theater owners. 
4.1. Background  
  In general, admission pricing appears to be at odds with the predictions of traditional 
pricing models. For example, a recent literature documents the general industry practice of 
constant admission prices across motion pictures at a given theater and over time for a 
specific motion picture regardless of demand (Orbach and Einav, 2007).  While there is 
price discrimination across consumer groups (adults, children under twelve years of age, 
seniors over sixty years of age, and veterans), there has been little use of price discrimination 
by time of day or day of the week until more recently (Davis, 2005).     22 
  In addition, even today theater owners and distributors have potentially conflicting 
incentives concerning admission prices.  For example, while they both share box office 
receipts, theater owners keep all of concessions sales.  As a result, several authors have 
noted that theater owners would prefer lower prices in order to increase concession sales.  
While theater owners can specify lower admission prices in their bids to the distributors, they 
are unlikely to be granted the right to show the film.  Even though price fixing is illegal per se 
in the United States, theater owners are technically proposing the price to be charged, 
making the implicit fixing of admission prices in the contract exempt.  
  As a result, prices are determined implicitly by the distributors in order to maximize 
sales revenue with the most significant variation across contracts the percentage of the sales 
revenues to be given to the distributor (Filson et al).16 There appears, however, to be some 
variation in prices due to the degree of market competition.  For example, using data from 
1993 to 1997, Davis finds that admission prices are slightly lower in more competitive 
markets.   
  Despite the general lack of variation in ticket prices found in the literature, we expect 
that the laws could influence admission prices if they impacted a theater owner’s marginal 
costs or bid price. For example, Blumenthal (1988) analyzed a number of contracts involving 
theater owners in both blind bid and trade screen states and found that bid prices were   23 
higher on average in states that had banned blind bidding.17 Since the admission price 
schedule is a part of the bid, this result gives some indirect support to the studios’ claims that 
banning blind bidding could lead to higher admission prices as theater owners attempt to out-
bid one another for the films with the largest box-office potential.18 As a result, we 
anticipated that the laws banning blind bidding could result in higher ticket prices due to 
higher bid prices for the most successful films. 
4.2. Data and Methods 
  Because of data availability, we compare prices in the three cities of Cleveland, 
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh with those of Detroit.  We obtained the data from Variety, which 
sampled between ten and twenty theaters weekly from fifteen cities. Most cities appeared at 
least once a month.   We sampled each city quarterly. Each sample included cities in the 
                                                                                                                                             
16 Recently Moul (2007) uses a structural model to measure the degree of collusion among 
distributors.  In order to estimate his model he assumes that admission prices are exogenous 
to both distributors and exhibitors on a weekly basis. 
17 Forsythe, Isaac, and Palfrey (1989) used blind bidding as motivation for laboratory 
experiments with n buyers and one seller in a sealed-bid, first-price auction.  They concluded 
that their results implied that the anti-blind bidding laws were unnecessary as buyers would 
learn that a seller withholds information when it is unfavorable.  In their model a seller would 
abandon blind bidding once all buyers learn that withholding information was in the seller’s 
best interest and not theirs.  However, the studios generally did just the opposite by trade 
screening relatively less desirable films and blind bidding highly anticipated films. 
 
18 While the studios/distributors’ main marginal cost per film is due to advertising 
expenditures, studios incurred additional expenses in trade-screened states due to the costs 
of sales prints especially made for the purpose of trade screening. According to Barry   24 
entire metropolitan area. For example, Detroit included theaters from surrounding areas of 
Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties. 
  Since theater owners bid on films six months to one year in advance of the release 
date, we cannot be completely sure which films were blind bid during the first year that the 
anti-blind bidding laws were in effect.  For example, Ohio enacted the law in October 1978, 
but theater owners may have bid for films to be released in April 1979 or as far away as 
October 1979.  We address the possible lagged effect of the law on films by examining 
admission prices using two different time periods: (1) two years before and after a law, and 
(2) three years before and after a law. As before, we consider the passage of the Ohio and 
Pennsylvania laws a natural experiment and compare the change in the population means.  
We assume that relative changes in price approximate the effect of the law.   
  Figure 4 displays average admission prices for Cleveland and Detroit from 1975 to 
1981.  Detroit’s average prices remain consistently above Cleveland’s throughout.  Average 
admission prices for Cleveland and Detroit remain relatively steady before the 
implementation of the law, implying the assumption of a common trend appears valid. Table 
5 shows that Detroit’s prices increase by seven cents and Cleveland’s rise by 16 cents after 
passage of the law.  Since the seven cent increase in average prices is assumed to control for 
how Cleveland’s prices would have changed in the absence of the law, the Ohio law 
                                                                                                                                             
Reardon, distributional president at Warner Brothers, the additional expense to trade screen 
amounted to approximately $50,000 per film (Robbins, 1985, p. 80).   25 
significantly increases Cleveland’s average prices by nine cents.  Cleveland’s relative average 
prices are lower by only one cent, however, when we compare prices starting three years 
prior to the passage of the law. 
  Figure 5 shows average prices in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh versus those in Detroit 
from 1977 to 1983.  For the first two years, prices are nearly identical.  In 1979 and 1980, 
the difference in average prices remains relatively steady at 10 and 15 cents, respectively.  
Beyond 1980, the difference in average prices increases, ranging from 36 to 41 cents.  Table 
6 shows that average prices for Philadelphia and Pittsburgh rise after the passage of 
Pennsylvania’s law by 43 cents while Detroit’s increases by 11 cents for a statistically 
significant 32-cent increase in admission prices.  When we extend the time period to a total 
of six years, the law causes higher average admission prices for Philadelphia and Pittsburgh 
by 53 cents. 
5. Delays 
  For completeness we also examined the claim made by movie studios that the laws 
would significantly delay the release of films. The studios warned of delays of three to six 
months, but some theater owners expected delays of at most one month (Brill, 1978). We 
investigate whether the anti-blind bidding laws of Ohio and Pennsylvania produced delays by 
tabulating the number of weeks films had been released in each city.  Given available data, 
we paired Cleveland with Detroit and Philadelphia with New York City.  We find evidence 
that Cleveland and Philadelphia do not exhibit films later after the passage of the laws.   26 
  To this day release dates for large budget films follow strong seasonal trends.  Einav 
(2007) has shown recently that the release pattern is even more pronounced than that 
expected due to seasonality in demand.  He contends that the pricing rigidity documented 
earlier in this paper creates an amplification effect.  Given this seasonal release pattern and 
the relatively low number of releases during the earlier time period of our study, delays in 
release dates in states banning blind bidding would have reduced the supply of films during 
peak periods and, possibly, result in significantly lower revenues.  As a result, despite the 
studios’ warnings about long delays, they had a strong incentive to provide films in a timely 
manner.  Lost revenues from delayed films in the critical opening weeks as a film could be 
substantial.   
5.1.  Data and Methods 
  As mentioned earlier, studios generally blind bid the top grossing films.19  Variety 
reported the number of weeks a film was exhibited in a city for the top twenty films in each 
year from 1975 to 1985.  Variety sampled theaters from downtown areas and surrounding 
suburban areas in the cities of Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia.  For New York City, 
Variety consistently sampled theaters in Manhattan.20 
                                                 
19 “The top 10 grossing films last year as listed by Variety were all blind bid.  The worst 10 
of the last year were trade screened” (Bratman, 1980). 
20In some cases, we were unable to obtain information for all of the top twenty films each 
year.  For example, Benji (1974) was the third highest grossing film in 1975, but Variety did   27 
 
5.2  Results 
  Before the Ohio law, Cleveland exhibited 24 films later than Detroit did and the 
average delay was 3.75 weeks.  After passage of the law, only eight films were delayed with 
the average delay of 1.75 weeks.  In addition, before the law we find eight times where 
Cleveland exhibited a film before Detroit and 67 times were films were released at the same 
time.  After the law, 60 films were exhibited in Cleveland before Detroit, and 53 were 
released at the same time.  We find the average weeks of delay are 0.81 before the law and 
-0.44 after it.  Therefore, after the Ohio anti-blind bidding law, films were exhibited sooner 
on average in Cleveland than in Detroit. 
  Before the passage of Ohio’s law, this percentage ranged from 15 to 35 percent. 
After the law, the percentage peaked at 15 percent in 1980 and 1981, and dropped 
between 0 and 5 percent through 1985.  Therefore, delays occurred less frequently after 
passage of the Ohio law. 
  Before passage of the Pennsylvania law Philadelphia received films after New York 
City 47 times with the average delay of 2.78 weeks, while after passage of the law only six 
delays occurred with an average length of 3.5 weeks.  Prior to passage of the law, there 
were two instances when Philadelphia exhibited a film before New York City and 77 times 
                                                                                                                                             
not furnish information about its film release pattern for Cleveland, Detroit, Philadelphia, and 
New York City.  In circumstances like this, we included the next highest grossing film.    28 
films were exhibited at the same time.  After passage of the law, Philadelphia exhibited a film 
before New York City one time, and 87 times films had the same release date.  The average 
weeks of delay before the passage of the law were 0.52 weeks and 0.36 afterwards.  
  In summary, after passage of the Pennsylvania law, delays occurred less frequently 
and films were released about the same time on average. The percentage of films delayed in 
Philadelphia drops sharply from 60 percent in 1975 to 10 percent in 1980.  From 1981 to 
1985, the percentage of delayed films does not exceed 10 percent.  This provides further 
evidence that delays occurred less frequently after the Pennsylvania law. 
7. Conclusion 
  Laws banning blind bidding and guarantees were intended to help theater owners 
remain in business.  However, the decline of the typical one and two-screen theaters was a 
trend that the laws could not reverse.  All theater owners were initially affected by the 
scarcity of new releases and the concentration of blockbuster films into a few peak periods. 
At the time the laws were being passed, the industry was experiencing dramatic changes that 
eventually made the laws counterproductive.  The studios were able to stimulate demand 
through the production of event films where the top twenty films in any given year produced 
at least half of the box office gross.  Theater owners that remained competitive converted 
theaters to the multiplex concept in order to have a greater likelihood of exhibiting 
blockbuster films and diversifying risk.      29 
  In addition, studios changed their philosophy on the release pattern of films.  Prior to 
the passage of the laws, films followed a slow release pattern where only a handful of 
theaters exhibited a new release in a limited number of cities during their first-run.  However, 
over time studios changed their distribution strategy to a fast release pattern, making first-run 
films more widely available upon their initial release. Through the development of the ancillary 
markets, cable television and VCRs, the decades long product shortage came to an end.  By 
the early 1980’s new releases were consistently double their previous levels of the early blind 
bidding years.   
  The econometric results that we present in this paper suggest that even the strictest 
state laws had at most a limited and short-lived impact on theater survival. Our results are in 
the spirit of those found by Sutton (1991) for a number of other similarly highly concentrated 
but competitive industries, because theater owners reacted to the change in the distribution 
pattern of new films by investing endogenously in quality (that is, number of screens).  
Moviegoers were better off in terms of quality, because a wider selection of films were 
present in one location.21  
  In addition, we find some evidence that the laws increased admission prices for the 
relatively more successful films giving support to the argument that blind bidding actually 
benefited those theater owners who diversified to spread risk while paying lower guarantees   30 
and bid prices per film. The laws actually offset some of this advantage, since banning blind 
bidding resulted in higher bid prices for the most promising films that these theater owners 
would have shown anyways. As a result, one could argue that the laws were an unnecessary 
attempt to protect less efficient theaters from going out of business while penalizing those 
theater owners who modernized by improving the quality of their theaters.  
 
                                                                                                                                             
21 Recently, Ellickson (2007) provides similar evidence for endogenous investments in 
supermarket quality. Consumers experience a higher level of quality as supermarkets offer a 
wider selection of products in larger stores.   31 
References 
  Blumenthal, Marsha, “Auctions with Constrained Information: Blind Bidding For 
Motion Pictures,” The Review of Economics and Statistics (May 1988), 191-198. 
 
  Bratman, F. “Blind Bidding on Films Fought” New York Times, (March 2, 1980), p. 
LI1. 
  Brill, Steven, “Litigating Bad B.O.”, Esquire, September 26, 1978. 
 
  Chen, Ming-Yuan, “Survival Duration of Plants: Evidence From the US Petroleum 
Refining Industry,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20 (2002), 517-
555. 
 
  Davis, Peter, “The Effects of Local Competition on Admission Prices in the U.S. 
Motion Picture Exhibition Market,” Journal of Law and Economics, 48 (October 2005), 
677-708. 
   
  Dunne, Timothy, Shawn D. Klimek, and Mark J. Roberts, “Exit from Regional 
Manufacturing Markets: The Role of Entrant Experience,” International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 23 (2005), 399-421. 
 
  Einav, Liran, “Seasonality in the U.S. Motion Picture Industry,” Rand Journal of 
Economics, 38 (Spring 2007), 127-145. 
 
  Ellickson, Paul B., “Does Sutton Apply to Supermarkets?” RAND Journal of 
Economics, 38 (Spring 2007), 43-59. 
 
  Encyclopedia of Exhibition (National Association of Theater Owners: annual) 
   
  Filson, Darren; Switzer, David; and Portia Besocke, “At the Movies: The 
Economics of Exhibition Contracts,” Economic Inquiry, 43 (April 2005), 354-369. 
 
  Forsythe, Robert; Isaac, Mark R.; and Thomas R. Palfrey, “Theories and Tests of 
‘Blind Bidding’ in Sealed-Bid Auctions,” RAND Journal of Economics (Summer 1989), 
214-238. 
 
  Galbraith IV, Stuart, Motor City Marquees: A Comprehensive, Illustrated 
Reference to Motion Picture Theaters in the Detroit Area: 1906-1992, Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland and Company, 2001.   32 
 
  Gottschalk, Earl, Jr., “Theater Chains Revolt against Hollywood’s Method of 
Marketing,” Wall Street Journal, (August 9, 1979), 1 and 29. 
 
  Guback, Thomas, “The Motion Picture Business in the 1980’s” in Ina Rae Hark, 
Exhibition, the Film Reader, New York, Routledge, 2001. 
  International Motion Picture Almanac, New York, Quigley Publications, 1974-
1986. 
 
  Jacobson, Harlan, “NATO: Bids Could Hit 2d, 3d Runs, Too”, Variety, May 16, 
1979. 
 
  Jacobson, Harlan, “NATO Sees, MPAA Denies Blind Bid ‘Tilt’” Variety, May 17, 
1978. 
 
  McCloughan, Patrick and Ian Stone, “Life Duration of Foreign Multinational 
Subsidiaries: Evidence from U.K. Northern Manufacturing Industry 1970-93,” 
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 16 (1998), 719-747. 
 
  Mata, Jose, Pedro Portugal, and Paulo Guimaraes, “The Survival of New Plants: 
Start-Up Conditions and Post-Entry Evolution,” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 13 (1995), 459-481. 
 
  Moul, Charles C., “Retailer Entry Conditions and Wholesaler Conduct: The 
Theatrical Distribution of Motion Pictures,” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 26 (2008), 966-983. 
 
  Myers, Peter S., “The Studio as Distributor” in Jason Esquire, The Movie Business 
Book, Prentice Hall, 1983. 
 
  Orbach, Barak Y. and Liran Einav, “Uniform Prices for Differentiated Goods: The 
Case of the Movie-theater Industry,” International Review of Law and Economics, 7 
(2007), 129-153. 
 
  Paul, William, “The K-Mart Audience at the Mall Movies,” Film History 6 (1994), 
487-501. 
  Robbins, Jim, “Texas Passes on Blind Bidding; Bills Dangle in State Legislatures”, 
Variety, May 20, 1981.   33 
 
  Sedgwick, John, “Product Differentiation at the Movies: Hollywood, 1946 to 1965,” 
Journal of Economic History, 62 (September 2002), 676-705. 
 
  Steinburg, Cobbett S., Real Facts. New York, Vintage Books, 1978. 
 
  Sutton, John, Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising 
and the Evolution of Concentration. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press: 1991. 
 
  Variety, “Fewer Big-Budget Films Made It Pay,” January 8, 1986. 
Variety, “MPAA Hits NATO’s Anti-advances Idea,” May 18, 1977. 
  Waterman, David, Hollywood’s Road to Riches, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005. 
 
     34 
Figure 1   
 






















































Source: Encyclopedia of Exhibition (National Association of Theater Owners: annual)    35 
Figure 2  
 

























Source: Encyclopedia of Exhibition (National Association of Theater Owners: annual)   36 
Table 1  
 
States that Enacted Laws Banning Blind Bidding 
 
State  Year Enacted  Guarantees Permitted 
Alabama  1978  Yes 
Arkansas  1981  Yes 
Georgia  1979  Yes 
Idaho  1979  No 
Indiana  1980  Yes 
Kansas  1981  Yes 
Kentucky  1980  No 
Louisiana  1978  Yes 
Maine  1979  Yes 
Massachusetts  1979  Yes 
Missouri  1982  Yes 
Montana  1981  No 
New Mexico  1979  Yes 
North Carolina  1979  Yes 
Ohio  1978  No 
Oregon  1979  Yes 
Pennsylvania  1980  No 
South Carolina  1978  Yes 
Tennessee  1979  Yes 
Utah  1979  No 
Virginia  1978  Yes 
Washington  1979  Yes 
West Virginia  1979  Yes 
Wisconsin  1984  No 
 
Source: Encyclopedia of Exhibition (National Association of Theater Owners: annual)   37 
Figure 3  
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Log L  -133.41   
Cases  228   
 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
   39 
Table 3  

















































Log L  -411.46   
Cases  750   
 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Significant at the 10 percent level.   40 
Table 4 
   
Duration Model Estimates of Movie Theater Survival  
Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania and New York, 1977-1985 
 
   




Pennsylvania, Michigan, and 
New York 
 






























































































Log L  -975  -951  -877  -870  -1254 
Cases  3453  3453  3447  3447  4860 
 
Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Significant at the 10 percent level.   41 
Figure 4   
 





























Ohio Law Passed in 1978
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 Table 5 
 







(1) – (2) 







































Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Significant at the 10 percent level 
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Figure 5   
 
Average Movie Theater Admission Prices, Philadelphia & 
































Pennsylvania Law Passed in 1980
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Table 6 
   
Average Admission Price  





















































Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
** Significant at the 10 percent level 
  
 